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TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: SANTA CLARA PUEBLO V.
MARTINEZ: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 146 YEARS
LATER
C. L. Stetson*
On May 15, 1978, the Supreme Court of the United States hand-
ed down a decision that will have enormous impact on the sover-
eignty of tribal worlds.' Reversing the appellate court decision, 2
the Supreme Court, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,3 held that
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968) did
not expressly nor implicitly grant federal court jurisdiction over
civil actions against the tribes, arising out of the guarantees
within the Act.
The Act reads in part: "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of
self-government shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of
liberty or property without due process of law .... ." Prior to the
unexpected Supreme Court decision, most federal courts and
legal commentators who had cause to consider the impact of the
Indian Civil Rights Act on tribal sovereignty comfortably assumed
that the Act clearly intended to provide for federal forums for the
adjudication of grievances against the tribal governments." The
decision in Martinez, however, means that individual Indians
with complaints against their tribal leaders or regulations have no
recourse to a federal court for adjudication of their rights and
must instead remain within the jurisdiction of the tribal courts.
The case began when Julia Martinez and her daughter, in-
dividually and as representatives of a class, brought an action
against the Santa Clara Tribe for declaratory and injunctive relief
against the enforcement of a 1939 tribal ordinance that denied
tribal membership to all children of Santa Clara women who
married nonmembers of Santa Clara Pueblo. Yet the same or-
* Second Place Winner, 1980 Indian Law Writing Competition. B.A. 1970, Vassar;
M.A. 1972, Brown; Ph.D. 1977, New Mexico; J.D. expected 1981, New Mexico.
1. Case law establishing tribal sovereignty began in 1832 with Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
2. United States v. Martinez, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976). The court held that the
Indian Civil Rights Act provides for federal jurisdiction in intratribal civil disputes and
that the tribes are compelled by the fourteenth amendment to observe equal protection
and due process requirements, despite tribal claims of sovereign immunity.
3. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
4. See, e.g., Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D.N.M. 1975);
Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968); Jones, Should Indians Have A Cause
of Action Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?, 3 AM. L. Ray. 183 (1975).
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dinance allowed tribal membership to all children of Santa Clara
men who married outside of the pueblo. Martinez contended that
the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act prohibited such discrimination
as a denial of equal protection and due process.
The plaintiffs claimed specifically the denial of three categories
of rights: political (nonmembers are not allowed to vote or par-
ticipate in secular duties), material (nonmembers are denied land
and irrigation water use rights as well as tribal pecuniary
benefits), and residential (nonmembers are technically not al-
lowed to continue living on the reservation once the Santa Clara
mother dies). The plaintiffs further contended that the economic
considerations that prompted the original criteria for membership
were no longer viable.
Although the district court5 and the court of appeals6 differed
in their decisions on the merits, neither had difficulty in finding
that there was in fact jurisdiction. The defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction at the district court level was
denied on two occasions; the court first found that cited prece-
dent in favor of such dismissal was based on situations arising
prior to the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act, and then
found that the Act allowed for federal jurisdiction over intratribal
controversies previously not within federal purview. The court of
appeals affirmed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) for ac-
tions under the Act, noting that said Act was intended to protect
tribal members from misuse of tribal authority and, as such, must
have the power to implement such protection in order to avoid
making the Act "a mere unenforceable declaration of
principles." 7
On reaching the merits, the district court expressed its reluc-
tance to rule on cultural survival values, and held that the or-
dinance of 1939 employed traditional criteria in regulating
membership and as such did not violate the provisions of the Act.
Looking to the legislative intent, the court found that Congress
did not intend to grant constitutional guarantees of due process
and that, therefore, the Act should not be used to invalidate
tribal membership ordinances based on traditional values.
The court of appeals also looked into legislative history to
determine whether the rights enumerated in the Indian Civil
Rights Act were coextensive with constitutional rights of equal
protection and due process. The court found that the purpose of
5. United States v. Martinez, 402 F. Supp, 5 (D.N.M. 1975).
6. 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976).




the original bill (and thus the Act) was to confer upon tribal
members the fundamental rights enjoyed by all other Americans.
Noting conspicuous omissions (e.g., there was no provision pro-
hibiting the establishment of a religion), the court concluded that
Congress was obviously aware of traditional Indian cultures and
concerns, and reserved only such basic rights to tribal members as
were considered necessary without undermining tribal law. The
court than held that fourteenth amendment standards, though
not applicable with full force, were persuasive to the degree that
Santa Clara's interests in discriminating on the basis of sex were
not compelling.
Discussion of its rationale led the court into examination of the
motivation and history of the Ordinance of 1939. Prior to its
adoption, intratribal marriages were handled on an individual
basis; the ordinance was developed in response to economic con-
siderations of a growing community, fearful that an increasing
population would put too much demand on the land and would
decrease individual shares. This is no longer an applicable con-
sideration for the tribe. Several alternative methods of determin-
ing membership were pointed out by the court, which did not feel
compelled, therefore, to regard the ordinance as an embodiment
of traditional values and heritage.
The Supreme Court did not even reach these issues, however.
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,' held that Indian tribes
are sovereign nations and, as such, are barred from suit by im-
munity that cannot be waived except by express legislative enact-
ment. The Indian Civil Rights Act was held not to constitute such
a waiver.
In discussing precedent, the Court noted that constitutional
provisions did not operate against the tribal governments prior to
the Act. The Court, in its reading of the Act's legislative history,
concluded that omissions as to remedies available to tribal
members (against their respective tribes) were deliberate, and the
congressional policies regarding self-determination supported this
reading. Furthermore, the Court indicated that tribal courts and
even nonjudicial tribal institutions have traditionally been
available for redress of injuries, thus making federal judicial in-
tervention unnecessary.
Justice White's dissent indicated his belief that federal jurisdic-
8. Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion; Justice Rehnquist joined in parts I,
I1, IV, and V of the Court's opinion. Justice White dissented. Justice Blackmun took no
part in the consideration or decision.
1980]
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tion was conferred by the Act and that Congress did not intend to
deny a cause of action to enforce the very rights which it
simultaneously granted. He further felt that the very nature of
the Santa Clara government-that is, the tribal council's embodi-
ment of both legislative and judicial powers-prevented the
forum from being a realistic and practicable means of redress for
its members.
A detailed analysis of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez is useful
in understanding the current status of tribal sovereignty and in at-
tempting to discover an appropriate perspective for evaluation
and discussion of the implications for future tribal and federal ac-
tivity. Although the Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of
the case, its discussion of precedent and legislative intent brought
it to a consideration of traditional tribal concerns and potential
congressional involvement. The Supreme Court decision, for the
time being, controls the future of tribal sovereignty and sets the
federal policy in relationship to the tribes.
Analysis
We are of the same opinion with the people of the United
States; you consider yourselves as independent people; we, as
the original inhabitants of this country, and sovereigns of the
soil, look upon ourselves as equally independent, and free as
any other nation or nations. This country was given to us by
the Great Spirit above; we wish to enjoy it, and have our pass-
age along the lake, within the line we have pointed out.
Joseph Brant, 1794
In its efforts to address the issue of whether the Indian Civil
Rights Act authorizes federal intervention in civil actions against
the individual tribes, the Supreme Court traced briefly the history
of federal-tribal relationships, beginning with Worcester v.
Georgia,9 which established that "Indian tribes are 'distinct, in-
dependent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights' in matters of local self-government."'' 0 In Worcester, the
state of Georgia claimed jurisdiction within Cherokee boun-
daries, arresting and imprisoning a non-Indian who had tribal
permission to reside on the land. Chief Justice Marshall's opin-
ion, denying Georgia jurisdiction, characterized tribal powers as
9. 31 U.S. (6 Pei.) 515 (1832).




reserved, not created, and went on to assert the nature of tribal
sovereignty as independent of state control and power. Felix
Cohen elaborates:
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported
by a host of decisions . . . is the principle that those powers
which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general,
delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but
rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never
been extinguished."
The Supreme Court in Martinez further recognized that "[a]s
separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have
historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitu-
tional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or
state authority."' " In Talton v. Mayes,'3 the Court held that the
fifth amendment did not operate as a restriction upon the powers
of tribal governments; this decision was subsequently extended to
exempt tribal governments from compliance with certain other
amendments. '"
One of the characteristics of sovereign powers is their immuni-
ty from suit, long recognized as extending to Indian tribes.'
5
Talton noted the congressional authority to modify or even
eliminate this immunity and right to self-government,' 6 but the
Supreme Court acknowledged that "'without congressional
authorization,' the 'Indian Nations are exempt from suit.' United
States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, 309 U.S.,
at 512, 60 S.C. at 656."' 7
The Indian Civil Rights Act was, according to the Supreme
Court, just such a congressional authorization, intending to im-
pose certain guidelines upon the tribes; however, the Court held
that "[n]othing on the face of Title I of the ICRA purports to
11. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942) (emphasis added).
12. 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
13. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
14. See, e.g., Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe,
370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967) (due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
15. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Turner
v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
16. 163 U.S. 376, 380 (1896). Congress has the constitutional authority to deal with
the tribes, expanding or modifying their powers as Congress sees fit, e.g., the Major
Crimes Act and the Indian Reorganization Act. The Supreme Court in Martinez notes
that, while Congress did not confer federal jurisdiction through the vehicle of the ICRA,
it certainly could have done so.
17. 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
1980]
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subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil ac-
tions for injunctive or declaratory relief."' 8
In next addressing the issue of whether an officer of the pueblo
would be protected by this tribal immunity, the Court weighed
policy considerations characterized in part by the decision in Cort
v. Ash. 9 Here, a test was proposed that would help determine if
a cause of action, not specifically provided for by statute, could
be inferred. Obviously, for the federal courts to agree to exercise
jurisdiction over tribal officers acting in behalf of and in accor-
dance with the rules of a tribe would be to undermine tribal
authority. Out of deference both to tribal and to congressional
powers, the Court expressed its intentions to "tread lightly in the
absence of clear indications of legislative intent." 20 An analysis of
the Indian Civil Rights Act failed to persuade the Court that
federal jurisdiction was required in order to implement the Act.
In fact, the Court noted that "the structure of the statutory
scheme and the legislative history of Title I suggest that Con-
gress' failure to provide remedies other than habeas corpus was a
deliberate one."
'2'
The purpose of the Act was twofold: to protect individual In-
dian citizens from infringement of their rights by the tribal
governments, but also to promote Indian self-determination. The
latter policy has a solid foundation in both judicial decisions and
legislative enactments. Congressional commitment to Indian self-
government is demonstrated within the Indian Civil Rights Act
itself, which provides only for selected rights and safeguards in
recognition of "the unique political, cultural, and economic
needs of tribal governments." ' 22 In a footnote to its decision, the
Court pointed out the results of congressional selectivity:
The provisions of § 1302, . . . differ in language and in
substance in many other respects from those contained in the
constitutional provisions on which they were modeled. The
provisions in the Second and Third Amendments, in addition
to those of the Seventh Amendment, were omitted entirely.
The provision here at issue, § 1302(8), differs from the con-
stitutional Equal Protection Clause in that it guarantees "the
18. Id. at 59.
19. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
20. 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978).
21. Id. at 61.




equal protection of its [the tribe's] laws," rather than of "the
laws." 23
The dual purposes of the Act are often at odds with each other,
and the Supreme Court was very cautious about choosing one at
the expense of the other. To create a federal cause of action
against the tribes not only would undermine the tribal authority
but also "would impose serious financial burdens on already
'financially disadvantaged' tribes." '24 Neither of these alternatives
is in the congressionally expressed interest of promoting Indian
self-determination. The Court decided that such a federal cause
of action was unnecessary since both tribal courts and non-
judicial tribal institutions have been recognized as effective and
competent forums for litigating internal tribal affairs in the past.
Although Julia Martinez was unsuccessful in her invocation of
tribal remedies, there is no doubt that they were available to her
and that she did in fact have a number of opportunities to ap-
peal, not only to the tribal council but also to the entire com-
munity of Santa Clara. The judicial system of the tribe consists of
an annually elected governor and the tribal council. This body
listens to both sides of the problems brought before it; interested
parties, similar to our amicus curiae, are allowed to present their
opinions as well. The final decision is then made.
2 5
Julia Martinez first approached her representative to the coun-
cil, asking him to take up the issue of membership criteria; her
representative refused. Martinez and her supporters then peti-
tioned the tribal council and were successful in convening the en-
tire community. The Santa Claras, as a body, voted against
changing the Ordinance of 1939. Martinez then attempted to have
her Navajo husband enrolled within the Santa Clara Tribe.
Although her efforts were unsuccessful, Martinez had several
auditions with her representatives, the governor, and the tribal
council.2 6 The Supreme Court did not discuss Martinez's exhaus-
tion of tribal remedies (previously held by lower courts to be a
prerequisite to invocation of federal jurisdiction27), since it deter-
23. Id. at 63 n.14.
24. Id. at 64.
25. Note, Constitutional Law: Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Tribal Membership
and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 6 Am. IND. L. REv. 205, 215 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Note].
26. 402 F. Supp. 5, 11 (D.N.M. 1975).
27. See, e.g., Morigeau v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, No. CV-77-25-M
(D. Mont. 1977) (ICRA requires exhaustion of tribal remedies unless they are inadequate
or resort to them would be futile).
1980]
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mined that tribal forums presented appropriate and ample oppor-
tunities to seek resolution of intratribal disputes.
The Court's unwillingness to find a federal cause of action
under the Indian Civil Rights Act was further reinforced by its
perusal of the legislative history, which indicated congressional
intent to allow for habeas corpus relief as the exclusive review
mechanism authorized under the Act. The Court noted that
"Congress considered and rejected proposals for federal review
of alleged violations of the Act arising in a civil context." ' 28 Many
tribes were strongly antagonistic, not merely to the review power,
but to the Act as a whole, 9 and a responsive Congress eliminated
the provision for suit by the Attorney General as well as declining
to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to review intratribal civil
actions .30
Tribal sentiment about the Bill of Rights has frequently been
adverse. The Pine Ridge Sioux, for example, rejected a proposi-
tion that would have extended the guarantee of basic rights to
their tribal members. As the vice chairman of the Lower Brule
Sioux Tribe testified: "The barrier seems to be getting across to
these people an understanding of what the devil the Bill of Rights
is. If they don't know what it is, they are not going to adopt
it.,,31
In a later Senate subcommittee hearing, a spokesman for
United Pueblos offered an explanation of the unwillingness of
many tribal people to adopt the rights which, for Anglo-
Americans, are cherished and vigorously protected. It might ap-
pear that the barrier arises not so much from a lack of under-
standing as from a lack of desire for the rights.
28. 436 U.S. 49, 67 (1978).
29. At Senate subcommittee hearings in 1969, members of the southwestern tribes
expressed their reasons for disliking the bill of rights forced upon them. Such law is
alien to traditional ways of thinking and living, and many Indians were offended at at-
tempts to infringe upon tribal sovereignty. The tribes also were afraid not only of impend-
ing destruction of traditional modes of governing but of the influx of non-Indian
lawyers and legal standards. Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of
Judicial Error in Construction of ICRA, 20 S.D. L. REv. 1, 42 (1975).
The other side is summarized by the Chairman of the Mescalero Apache Tribe:
"every Indian is opposed to the Indian Civil Rights Act ... until he has been screwed by
his tribal council." De Raismes, The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Pursuit'of
Responsible Tribal Self-Government, 20 S.D. L. REv. 59, n.1 (1975).
30. 436 U.S. 49, 67-68 (1978).
31. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.




We have learned, through many centuries, what is best for us,
and we hope that we may be allowed to follow the system
which we have found best suited to our needs .... We believe
we understand, better than non-Indians, the background and
traditions which shape Indian conduct and thinking, and we do
not want so important a matter to be tried by those who are
not familiar with them. . . . Pueblo officials are mindful of
their people and careful consideration is given to the rights of
the accused. Moreover, because we are not hedged about by
the trappings of the white man's courts and the possibilities of
the miscarriage of justice by lawyers who often succeed in
defeating justice by forensic skill and adroitness, substantial
justice is done and without resort to the delays characteristic of
non-Indian courts.
32
Congress seemed, in many ways, aware of these differences in
social values33 and may have considered that adjudication under
the Indian Civil Rights Act "will frequently depend on questions
of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may be in a
better position to evaluate than federal courts." 34
Although the Court accepted the customary recognition of
tribal courts as appropriate and competent forums for settling in-
tratribal disputes, it did, in the final paragraph of the majority
opinion, reaffirm the congressional authority to enact law that
would bring tribal cases within the purview of federal courts.
But unless and until Congress makes clear its intention to per-
mit the additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudica-
tion of such actions in a federal forum would represent, we are
constrained to find that § 1302 does not impliedly authorize ac-




Justice White, in his solitary dissent, did not find such a
restriction upon the courts, arguing that a private cause of action
against the tribe was not only consistent with legislative purpose
but in fact "necessary for its achievement." 36 Although White
32. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, on S. 961, S. 962, S. 966, S. 967, S. 968, and S.J. Res. 40 to Protect the
Constitutional Rights of American Indians, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 1965), pp. 352-53.
33. 436 U.S. 49, 62-63 nn.12, 13, 14 (1978).
34. Id. at 71.
35. Id. at 72.
36. Id. at 80.
19801
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agreed that Congress was concerned with the encouragement of
tribal self-determination, he did not feel it necessarily followed
that federal courts were prohibited from enforcing the provisions
of the Indian Civil Rights Act.
3 7
The fact that a statute is merely declarative and does not ex-
pressly provide for a cause of action to enforce its terms "does
not, of course, prevent a federal court from fashioning an ef-
fective equitable remedy," Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 414 n.13, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 2190 20 L.Ed.2d 1189
(1968) . *.. 38
Justice White's further dismay was with what he believed to be
the unrealistic and ineffective reliance upon tribal forums as ap-
propriate authorities for adjudicating tribal grievances. To sug-
gest that the tribal council (judicial) is the realistic place to seek
redress against the tribal council (legislative) for wrongs commit-
ted under the Indian Civil Rights Act is, for White, to ignore con-
gressional intent. His analysis of the Act and its history led him
to conclude "that Congress did not intend to deny a private cause
of action to enforce the rights granted . ,"39 and therefore he
was willing to proceed to the merits.
An evaluation of the majority opinion in Martinez necessarily
requires a look at its immediate impact as well as its long-range
implications. These are best viewed within a framework that
acknowledges the various circumstances that affect the coexisting
legal systems of the federal and tribal governments. As legal an-
thropologist Pospisil explains, "any penetrating analysis of law
of a primitive or civilized society can be attained only by relating
it to the pertinent societal structure and legal levels, and by a full
recognition of the plurality of legal systems within a society." '
Evaluation
I will not tell you a lie-I am going to tell the truth. You love
your country-you love your people-you love the manner in
which they live, and you think your people are brave. I am like
you, my Great Father, I love my country-I love my people-I
37. Id. at 81-82.
38. Id. at 73-74.
39. Id. at 74.
40. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 126 (1971)




love the manner in which they live, and think myself and war-
riors brave. Spare me then, Father; let me enjoy my country
Petalesharo, 1822
In order to evaluate the impact of the Indian Civil Rights Act
on the Santa Claras and other Indian tribes, it is necessary to
look into the structure of their community makeup, their
subgroup legal system. When alien systems are superimposed
upon a native system, a basic understanding of the two is re-
quired in order to speculate as to the results.
Legal systems, whatever their form, develop in response to a
necessity for order within a society and subgroups of the society.
Existing legal options are not always satisfactory, and need for
justice and stability creates pressure for the development of new
channels for dispute settlement.4' Whether the development of
legal systems is seen as a response to chaos or whether the
development of societal activity is seen as a response to inade-
quate legal strictures, the resultant systems function to resolve
disputes, punish offenses, and generally stave off the disorder
that challenges their very existence. 42 Ehrlich, a legal sociologist,
points out the interrelation between the rules of conduct and a
society's vitality.
Every human relation within the association, whether tran-
sient or permanent, is sustained exclusively by the rules of con-
duct. If the rules cease to be operative, the community
disintegrates; the weaker they become, the less firmly knit the
organization becomes. The religious communion dissolves if
the precepts of religion lose their validity. The family breaks up
if the members of the family no longer consider themselves
bound by the order of the family. 3
In discussing membership criteria and, specifically, the gender-
based discrimination claimed by Martinez, we must consider
traditional Santa Clara attitudes towards exogamy. As a
patrilocal society, dependent upon a strong sense of community
for its survival, Santa Clara has always been antagonistic to the
idea of marriage outside of the tribe.
41. See Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998 (1979).
42. POSPISIL, supra note 40, at 118.
43. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 40 (V. Moll, tr.
1936) [hereinafter cited as EHRLICH].
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Even when no ceremonial ties are involved, there is opposition
to people moving away. A single family, one person even, is a
loss and, besides, may start a migratory trickle. Town en-
dogamy is one expression of this feeling. Girls in particular are
made to feel that they should not marry out. A Sia girl wanted
to marry a Jemez man and live at Jemez. "If she marries him,
some day she may not be found," said the girl's father, "just
as it happened once when a Santa Clara girl left to marry a
San Juan man. That Santa Clara girl went into the hills and
never came back."
Marriages with non-Pueblos or non-Indians are even more
undesirable, a common belief being that, if you marry a Mexican,
an Anglo, or a Navajo, after your death you will turn into,
respectively, a mule, horse, or other animal.4 5 This intertown an-
tagonism extends to the point of blaming other tribal groups for
one's own misfortunes. Belief in witchcraft is prevalent, even to-
day, and suspicion of witchcraft running amok in neighboring
towns is not uncommon.46 It is not surprising then that many In-
dian communities so vehemently oppose matrimonial ties with
nonmembers.
This sort of consideration may seem at first to be of ethnology,
not of law; however, though a discussion of witchcraft is not ob-
viously related to the Bill of Rights, it does have its place. Legal
systems are not always, as many legal anthropologists and
sociologists point out, formulated in the mode to which we have
become accustomed.
Just as the technical expert in iron construction, when speaking
of iron, is not thinking of the chemically pure substance which
the chemist or the minerologist refers to as iron, but rather of
the chemically very impure compound that is used in iron con-
struction, so the jurist does not mean by law that which lives
and is operative in society as law, but, apart from a few
branches of public law, exclusively that which is of importance
as law in the judicial administration of justice.4 7
A large part of our present concern is with this "living law,"
but it is important to recognize that there are different manifesta-
44. 1 PARSONS, PUEBLO INDIAN RELIGION Pt. 1 (1939), p. 7 [hereinafler cited as PAR-
SONS].
45. Id. at 44.
46. Id. at 12.




tions of law, arising in response to different needs, growing into
different forms. In his investigation of several subgroups,
Pospisil found that, despite such differences:
The decisions of the leaders of the various subgroups bore all
the necessary criteria of law (in the same way that modern state
law does): the decisions were made by leaders who were re-
garded as jural authorities by their followers . . . ; these deci-
sions were meant to be applied in all "identical" (similar) cases
decided in the future ... ; they were provided with physical or
psychological sanctions .... and they settled disputes between
parties .... 48
Such decisions are not always readily recognizable as bona fide
legal controls though they function just as do sophisticated
modes of jurisprudence. Everyone is a member in a number of
groups and subgroups and is subject to the varying laws and pro-
cedures of each. This multiplicity of legal systems, each with its
own loyalties, purposes, and regulations, is the source of many of
the problems arising between federal and tribal societies.
Certainly, it is the basis of the problem in Martinez. Although
sex distinctions in kinship determinations are said-to be less im-
portant among the Santa Clara than among certain other tribes,4 9
women's roles in ceremonial life are comparatively minor, "and
the most precious things, fetishes, songs, prayers, and myths are
usually possessed by men." 50 In The Tewa World, written by a
Santa Clara anthropologist, the finishing rites (initiation) for
young boys is described, and then:
The meaning of the finishing rite for girls, on the other hand,
is more limited. They are finished, as one informant summa-
rized it, "only so that they will know, someday when they get
married, what their husbands mean when they say they have to
attend to kiva duties." This is the only time in their lives that
they will even get into the antechamber, for they may never im-
personate the gods."
Traditionally, because of patrilocal structures, a Santa Clara
woman is expected to move to the home of her husband. This, as
we have seen, frustrates the tribe's desire to stay together. If,
48. POSPISIL, supra note 40, at 106.
49. DOZIER, THE PUEBLO INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 165 (1970).
50. PARSONS, supra note 44, at 40.
51. ORTiz, THE TEWA WORLD 43 (1969).
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however, the woman remains in Santa Clara with her outsider
husband (as was the case when Julia Martinez married a Navajo,
member of a matrilocal society which expects a man to move to
the house of his wife), the most important religious figure in the
household-the man-will be a "profane" person, a nonpartici-
pant in the sacred (thus the only "real") world. He will be
unavailable to his children for religious instruction and discipline
in the Santa Clara ways.
Although there is reference in the court of appeals opinion to
the effect that in the past children of Santa Clara women
(who had married outsiders) were occasionally admitted to the
pueblo,52 these cases were decided on an individual basis. Such a
concession was uncommon and occurred only when the governing
factor of the pueblo weighed the various considerations and
decided that admission of the particular children was not harmful
to social and religious life. The court of appeals seemed to feel
that this was adequate reason to allow admission to all children of
Santa Clara women, that discrimination was not "traditional"
because it was not unbending. A more realistic appraisal would
be to recognize the compelling tribal interests in maintaining its in-
tegrity and then marvel at the flexibility and fairness exhibited by
the individualized approach of the tribal council. Each case was
decided on its unique merits. The fact that some children were
admitted while Martinez's were not is less an indication of sexual
discrimination than an indication that circumstances surrounding
her particular case were such as to deny the wisdom of extending
membership to Julia Martinez's family. The distinction is not an
arbitrary exercise of bias, based as it is on numerous important
social principles evolved in response to the ordering characteristic
of the particular people.
In the sense that the tribe has developed and accepted such
principles as controlling, it is law. Anglo-American reluctance to
appreciate the Santa Clara concept of order and control may
stem from a distrust of alien norms and from a belief that United
States law is the only applicable law for dealing with its citizens.
But, "[iut is not an essential element of the concept of law that it
be created by the state, nor that it constitute the basis for the
decisions of the courts or other tribunals, nor that it be the basis
of a legal compulsion consequent upon such a decision." 53
52. 540 F.2d 1039, 1047 (10th Cir. 1976).




The fact is that, for certain subgroups, within certain situa-
tions, state law (or federal law, in this context) is not always the
controlling and most successful of the various legal systems at
work. Though it might be the most all-encompassing, it is not
always the law that is followed. This becomes increasingly ob-
vious-and increasingly troublesome-when dealing with social
and religious norms which are integrated into the conflicting legal
systems.
Ehrlich, in discussing social and state sanction of subgroup
norms, claims that it is incorrect to say that competing subgroup
legal systems are actually in conflict. "To a certain extent," he
says, "the interests of the dominant groups must coincide with
the interests of the whole association, or at least with those of the
majority of the members of the association; for if this were not
so, the other members would not obey the norms established by
the dominant group." 5 The problem with this statement,
however, in relation to the particular circumstances before us, is
that the co-extant systems of the federal and tribal governments
resulted from a forced application.
New legal levels are created often by evolution or formal agree-
ment; a third method involves "conquest of one group by
another and a simultaneous retention of the former groupings as
segments of the new overall political structure," 5 as Pospisil ex-
plains. The imposition of the dominant system, forced upon a
significantly divergent system, necessarily will entail conflicts.
Llewellyn's and Hoebel's studies among the Cheyenne show that
the differences in customs and perspectives may lead to "utterly
and radically different bodies of 'law' .... .S6 Many of these are
not easily recognizable as such within a framework of traditional
American jurisprudence, but that they exist, function, and con-
flict can hardly be denied.
There are similar conflicts between federal law and state law,
even between an individual family's law and state law; although
one group might say a rule is constitutional and the other
disagree, though one group might condone an activity which the
other decries, their rules and decisions each qualify as parts of in-
tegral legal systems. To ignore this is to be hampered by
unrealistic expectations and ethnocentric moralities." Of course,
•54. Id. at 61.
55. POSPISIL. supra note 40, at 121.
56. LLEWLLYN & HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 28 (1941).
57. POSPISIL. supra note 40, at 112.
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this is not to say that all subsystems can be integrated into or
honored by the federal systems; the point is merely that they
coexist, whether in harmony-or in conflict. Joseph Goldstein, in
an essay on human dignity and criminal procedure, discusses a
similar problem in coping with the standards of individuals' or
minority subgroups' concepts of justice as opposed to the societal
standards of the system in control.
I have not meant to imply that the law is unambivalently com-
mitted to deferring to the dignity of all its citizens as human
beings. Rather it is its ambivalence which prompts or requires
clarification of what it authorizes and does in the name of, but
often not in the service of, human autonomy.8
The Supreme Court of the United States, faced with the prob-
lems inherent in the multiplicity of legal systems, resolved the
issue by recognizing the areas of conflict and avoiding them.
Although the Court did not discuss at length the characteristics of
tribal customs, it recognized the superior ability of tribal courts
to deal with such customs and traditions."
Sensitive to the differences and subtleties of the Santa Clara
system, the Court relied upon the effectiveness of intratribal
jurisdtction for the satisfaction of elaims.. To have decided other-
wise and to have found federal jurisdiction in intratribal matters
would be to ignore a basic, though unwritten, factor in determin-
ing such jurisdiction. Although the Indian Civil Rights Act may
or may not have given jurisdiction in the legal sense, the idea of
jurisdiction from an anthropological or sociological point of view
"means that three, the two litigants as well as the authority, have
to belong to the same social group in which the latter wields
judicial power (has jurisdiction). '" 60 Imposition of federal power
in intratribal disputes may not have been readily accepted by
tribes, which, in many cases, do not feel themselves to be a part
of the same social, religious, historical, legal system as that of the
Supreme Court. The presence within the tribes of adequate and
more appropriate forums gave the Court the opportunity to avoid
the conflict.
The existence of tribal sanctions, as effective if not more so
than those imposed by the federal government, works to ensure
58. Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrap-
ment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 702 (1975).
59. 436-U.S. 49, 68 (1978).




the protection of individual rights without interfering in the exer-
cise of tribal sovereignty.
The norms of ethical custom, morality, religion, tact, decorum,
etiquette, and fashion would be quite meaningless if they did
not exercise a certain amount of coercion. They too constitute
the order of the human associations, and it is their specific
function to coerce the individual members of the association to
submit to the order. All compulsion exercised by the norms is
based upon the fact that the individual is never actually an
isolated individual; he is enrolled, placed, embedded, wedged,
into so many associations that existence outside of these would
be unendurable, often even impossible, to him .... It is within
his circle that each man seeks aid in distress, comfort in misfor-
tune, moral support, social life, recognition, respect, honor. In
the last analysis it is his group that supplies him with everything
that he sets store by in life. 61
It would appear obvious that, to a Santa Clara, compulsion
would be most effective coming from within the community, as
the center of her/his world. And would it not seem more
realistic and desirable for Julia Martinez to conform to the
norms of Santa Clara, the source of her existence, than for Santa
Clara to be forced to conform to the norms of an alien society to
which it owes no debts and which, from a Santa Clara perspec-
tive, has been the subject of much antagonism, derision, and
heartache over the years?
Some argue that now "customary law is dead," and that tradi-
tional values have been lost in the reorganization of the tribal
governments in recent years. 62 A test has been proposed that.
would attempt to weigh tribal autonomy against fundamental
human rights, the burden being on the tribe to prove the existence
and rationale behind traditional cultural values. 63 The danger in
requiring such a balancing test is that the nexus is often difficult
to trace, and the factors being weighed are subjective and often
culturally idiosyncratic.
To attempt to characterize those aspects of a culture that are
"of compelling interest" from those that are not, appears from
this viewpoint an almost impossible task. A cultural distinction
61. EHRLICH, supra note 43, at 62-63.
62. De Raismes, supra note 29, at 104.
63. Id.
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embodied in particular rules may serve only a small function in
a culture and yet the vitality and continued existence of the en-
tire system of rules depends on the preservation of its compo-
nent parts.64
The Supreme Court's recognition of the difficulty and
undesirability of federal adjudication of intratribal problems
came as quite a surprise to many federal courts that had previous-
ly faced the problems head-on, believing that the Indian Civil
Rights Act gave federal jurisdiction over the tribes in civil suits.65
In the months following the Supreme Court's decision, several
reversals and some new decisions have been handed down in an
effort to comply with the Court's holding. Many of these cases
had originally been brought by individuals against their tribes in
an effort to prevent (or seek redress for) alleged tribal election ir-
regularities; the Martinez decision was applied retroactively.
66
The long-range implications are less predictable and more im-
portant, no matter which side one takes. Those in disagreement
with the Court's decision are quite justified in their unhappiness
about the denial of many rights by the tribal governments. Sanc-
tioning of sexual discrimination raises questions of whether any
legal system should be allowed to run roughshod over the basic
rights of its citizens in the name of cultural preservation. Joseph
de Raismes portrays the governing bodies as "disposed to
crushing individuals in their collective lumbering toward collec-
64. Note, supra note 25, at 214.
65. See, e.g., Laramie v. Nicholson, 487 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1973), aff'd, Thompson
v. Tonasket, 487 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1973). See also note 4, supra.
66. Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (individual can't join into suit
between two sovereign tribes); Mousseaux v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, No. 78-1414 (8th
Cir. 1978) (Martinez decision applied retroactively in claim for injunction against tribal
officials in election proceedings); Stands Over Bull v. Crow Tribe, 578 F.2d 799 (9th Cir.
1978) (repeals earlier decision and dismisses appeal); Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians, Inc., 584 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1978) (no jurisdiction over claim that tribal council
permitted election irregularities); Cogo v. Central Council of Tlingit, 465 F. Supp. 1286
(D. Alas. 1979) (Tlingit is a tribe and cannot be sued; thorough discussion of rationale);
Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community, 455 F. Supp. 462 (D. Mont. 1978) (no jurisdic-
tion for suit against tribal court); Wilson v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians,
457 F. Supp. 384 (D. Alas. 1978) (Indian village/council immune from suit); Wisconsin v.
Baker, 464 F. Supp. 1377 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (state challenged tribe's ordinance governing
fishing rights); Sturdevant v. Wilber, 456 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (distinguished
Martinez on the grounds that Menominee Restoration Committee (party sued) is merely
an interim governing body established by federal act; therefore there are no compelling
reasons to prohibit suit); Johnson v. Frederick, Civ. No. A78-2071, slip op. (Mar. 1979)




tive goals," 67 while Andra Pearldaughter "wonders whether the
Supreme Court would have reached a different result in resolving
the tension between racial/ethnic cultures had some interest more
central to white male institutions been in conflict with the
sovereignty and cultural autonomy of Native Americans."
' 68
Others agree with White's dissent because they feel that the
tribal courts are inadequate for adjudication of disputes against
the tribe. This is especially true for those Indian people who feel
that the hated BIA controls the tribal system in the first place and
is certainly not the proper forum in which to bring complaints.
To these people, "the veil of tribal sovereignty" provides Anglo
America with the means for invisible manipulation of Indian af-
fairs.
69
The most unfortunate result of the Martinez decision is that it
does, in fact, allow for the continuance of sexual discrimination
within the various tribes. This is particularly offensive to the ma-
jority of Americans, instilled as we are with such reverence for
our Bill of Rights. The unpleasant spectre of sanctioned
discrimination becomes more acceptable, however, when viewed
in context. For example, while state and federal governments are
prohibited from racial discrimination and the establishment of a
religion, Indian tribes have traditionally required both for their
continued existence. It is easier to make these exceptions if one
understands their applicability to a particular system. Equality
and justice according to tribal traditions may not correspond to
the Anglo versions of equality and justice, but qualitatively they
are comparable.7"
Despite the difficulties posed by the Martinez decision, there
are several advantages, not the least of which is to ensure a con-
sistency in federal court rulings which, prior to May 15, 1978, ap-
plied different standards of interpretation to the Indian Civil
Rights Act. 7' The Court also noted that denial of federal jurisdic-
tion in intratribal disputes would discourage "frivolous and vexa-
tious lawsuits," '7 2 thereby easing the pressure on financially weak
67. De Raismes, supra note 29, at 100.
68. Note, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection: Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo-Sexual Equality Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 6 Am. IND. L. REV. 187, 203
(1978).
69. De Raismes, supra note 29, at 101.
70. Note, supra note 25, at 216.
71. Id. at 210-11.
72. 436 U.S. 49, 67 (1978).
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tribes. Martinez serves to prevent the waste of money, both tribal
and federal, spent in litigation and damages.
The positive effects of the Supreme Court's stand also stem
from the reaffirmation of the concept of tribal sovereignty. Not
only does this increase the authority of the tribal governments
(which has been seriously eroded over the past few centuries), but
it also renews tribal confidence in the workability of self-
determination policies and gives incentive to the younger
members of the tribes to work within their own systems. Though
sovereignty may very well mask certain manipulative activities, it
is vitally important as the sole source of tribal power remaining to
the tribes; to discard the idea of sovereignty as "an unworthy
concept"" would be foolish-rather like throwing away the
trump card just because you don't like the player who dealt it.
The Martinez decision ensures at least token respect for differ-
ing modes of equality and justice. Faced with their new freedom,
and thus the responsibility, to exercise sovereign powers, the tribes
may very well take advantage of the opportunity to strengthen
tribal forums and to make them even more efficient and compe-
tent. There is always the danger of a congressional enactment to
remove such power from the tribal courts in the event that the
power is poorly exercised, and such a spectre is likely to spur the
various tribes into conscientious adjudication and application of
their laws.
The Martinez decision has also given the Indian tribes a big
chance, perhaps their last one, to salvage the remnants of their
native legal systems and to develop their governmental powers. It
is, in many ways, a landmark decision in the history of tribal law,
for it is an acknowledgment and acceptance by the dominant
system of the existence of conflicting systems. It is a sign,
therefore, to the tribal people that there is a chance for a con-
tinued existence of traditional societies, not otherwise possible
under policies of assimilation or eradication. If legal systems are
the orderings that prevent chaos and destruction, continuance of
such systems is requisite to a group's survival. The district court
recognized this in concluding its opinion:
Iuch has been written about tribal sovereignty. If those
words have any meaning at all, they must mean that a tribe can
make and enforce its decisions without regard to whether an
external authority considers those decisions wise. To abrogate




tribal decisions, particularly in the delicate area of member-
ship, for whatever "good" reasons, is to destroy cultural iden-
tity under the guise of saving it.
74
The Martinez decision prevented the enforcement of a
smothering paternalism that could ruin traditional Indian modes
of social, political, and religious life. "A self-governing society
must have the power to balance for itself the individual rights of
its members vis-a-vis the right of members to live together in a
cohesive, autonomous enduring unit. ' 15 The Supreme Court
decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez has given tribes this
control, this chance to endure.
The story of a People is the history of what they are doing.
It is the story of their struggle to continue. It is the story of
their resistance against that which will take their humanity
away. It is their will to win victory for all the People. It is not a
brief story and it is not pushed into a dark corner of a book or
a newspaper and forgotten. It lives and endures and continues.
Simon Ortiz, 1973
74. 402 F. Supp. 5, 11 (D.N.M. 1975).
75. Werhan, The Indian Civil Rights Act after Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 5
IND. L. REP. M-33 (1978).
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